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Article 7

RECENT CASE COMMENTS

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
BANKS AND BANKING-STATUTORY

PRESUMPTIONs-CoNsTITU-

"TioNAL LAw-In 1883 the State" of Georgia adopted a penal code
which contained a section to the effect that every insolvency of a
'bank shall be deemed fraudulent, and the president and directors shall
be severally punished -by imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary
for not less than one nor more than ten years with a proviso allowing for the rebutting of the presumption by a showing that the affairs
have been legally and fairly administered. Today this section is
substantially the same as the one first enacted.' During the ensuing
years after its passage, a number of cases have been decided, construing the legislative intent, and in the cases of State v. Griffin (1914)
and State v. Snead (1927), this section met a severe test, with the
result that the state supreme court, in every instance declared that
the statute was constitutional. 2 In the recent case of State v. Manley,3
in which the defendant was convicted under this section, an appeal
was taken to the United States Supreme Court which held that the
forty-five year old statute was unconstitutinal in that it violated the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The legislature has power to declare that a certain fact shall be
presumptive of the ultimate fact to be proved, provided there is a
reasonable connection between the facts proved and those which may
be inferred, and further, provided that the presumption is not arbitrary or conclusive. 4 This proposition has -beenso thoroughly threshed
out in a number leading cases, which seem to form a stock in
trade on the particular point, that the abstract rule permits of no new
tain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in
which the United States has or claims an interest"; that the adherence of the
United States on such terms was refused; that Mr. Root's efforts have produced a protocol which amounts to this, "whenever the World Court is
asked to opine on any question, then let the United States State Department
be previously informed, let every effort be made to frame the question in a
form acceptable to the State Department and if this proves impossible, then
let there be no hard feelings when the United States naturally withdraws from
adherence to the court." The New Republic, March 20, 1929, at 111, also
gives an account of Mr. Root's efforts.
'Youmans v. State, 7 Ga. App. 101, 66 S. E. 383 (1909).
'Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S. E. 540, L. R. A. 1915C, 716, Ann. Cas.
1916C, 80 (1914) ; Snead v. State, 165 Ga. 44, 139 S. E. 812 (1927).
'Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S. E. 170, 49 S. Ct. 215 (1928).
'2Wigmore, §1356. Hawes v. State, 258 U. S. 1, 42 S. Ct 204 (1922);
Meadowcroft v. People, 163 I1. 56, 45 N. E. 303, L. R. A. 1915C, 720
(1896); Mobile, Jackson and Kansas City R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S.
35, 31 S. Ct. 136 (1910); McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241
U. S. 79, 36 S. Ct. 498 (1916).
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variations. The effect of such a statute is to place upon the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence. It is a matter
of affirwative defense.5 This rule of presumptive guilt is especially
invoked where the defense rests within the knowledge of the accused.
The causes of insolvency represent clearly a state of facts that can
best be determined by evidence from the officers and directors of the
bank.
In the Manley case, the United States Supreme Court asserted
that the meaning of the statute had been changed by a more recent
statutory definition of insolvency, as follows, "A bank shall be
deemed insolvent: (1) When it cannot meet its liabilities when they
come due in the regular course of business; (2) When the actual cash
value of its assets is insufficient to pay its liabilities to depositors and
other creditors; (3) When its reserve shall fall below the amount
required and it shall fail to make good such reserve within thirty
days after being required to do so by the superintendent of banks." 6
In the Griffin case, the meaning of the word insolvency was restricted
to that condition in which the entire property and assets of the bank
are insufficient to pay all of its debts. However the Snead case dedared that the definition of insolvency as found in the banking act
was the proper basis for the presumption, and this view was followed
in the Manley case. The term insolvency is used in a dual sense.7
The general and popular meaning was used as the basis of the presumption in thq Griffin case, whereas its restricted meaning, to express the inability of a party to pay in the regular course of business,
was followed in the Snead and Manley cases. The usual definitions of
insolvency in bankruptcy statutes, that is, the restricted meaning,
should not be applied to the word when used in penal statutes. Otherwise, the bank would be forced to keep all deposits in the vault ready
for the depositor upon call. 8
z7 N. C. L. Rev. 41.
'Ga. Banking Act of 1919, Art. 1, §5.
'In Toof v. Martin, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 46, 20 L. Ed. 482, Mr. Justice

Field:."The term insolvency is not always used in the same sense. It is some-

times used to denote the insufficiency of the entire property and assets of a
person to pay his debts. This is its general and popular meaning. But it is also
used in a more restricted sense, to express the inability of a party to pay his

debts, as they become due in the regular bourse of business. It is in this latter
sense that the term is used when traders and merchants are said to be insolvent,
and as applied to them, it is the sense intended by the Act of Congress". The

Act referred to was the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544,
U. S.
St. 1913
§9585.137.
*37Compiled
Central Law
Journal
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In Ferry v. Ramsey,9 suit was brought under a statute Which raised
a prima facie case against officers and directors of a bank, making
insolvency a basis for knowledge of condition. The Kansas legislature defined solvency practically the same as Georgia. However, Mr.
Justice Holmes, in affirming a judgment for plaintiff, in that the
statute was constitutional, makes no reference to the correct interpretation of the term insolvency, and relies upon the fact that if the
legislature could make the act itself wrong, they can surely raise a
presumption. The basis of the presumption in both the Manley
and Ramsey cases is insolvency, imputing in the one instance "fraudulent mismanagement," and in the other "knowledge," with the further result that the liability in the one instance is criminal whereas in the other it is civil. The cases may be reconciled only upon the
tendency of the courts to interpret criminal statutes strictly.
Insolvency has been defined in North Carolina similarly as in
Georgia with one additional ground. 1° Also the receiving of deposits
with knowledge of insolvency is declared a felony, with the provision that the term insolvency shall not include any of the definitions
in the Banking Act." The North Carolina statute not only fails
to raise a prima facie case but incorporates the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in the Manley case by means of the
proviso. Clearly, the legislative definition of insolvency, which
exists for the purpose of protecting creditois in the property of the
bankrupt, should in no way be interpreted as a part of a penal statute,
and the effort of the Georgia Court to make use of the restricted meaning of insolvency in order to arouse a criminal liability is error.
D. M.

FEILD.

BILLS AND NOTES-PAYMENT OF CHECK WITHOUT PAYEE'S INDORSEMENT-LIABILITY OF DRAWEE TO DRAWER-The plaintiff drew

a check in favor of the Mizner Development Corporation, of Miami,
Florida, on defendant bank, which paid the check and debited the
'48 S. Ct. 443 (1928), 7 N. C. L. Rev. 63.
" N. C. C. S. §216(a) : "The term insolvency means, (a) When a bank cannot meet its deposit liabilities when they become due in the regular course of
business; (b) When the actual cash market value of its assets is insufficient
to pay its liabilities to depositors and other creditors; (c) When ts reserve shall
fall under the amount required by this act and it shall fail to make good such
reserve within thirty -days after being required to do so by the corporation
commission; (d) Whenever the undivided profits and surplus shall be inadequate to cover losses of the bank, whereby an impairment of the capital stock
iscreated.

IN. C. C. S. §224 (9).
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plaintiff's account. The check was indorsed only by the Boca Raton
ReSales Corporation and by two Florida banks as collecting agents.
The consideration subsequently failing, plaintiff sued defendant to
have her account credited with the amount of the check. The jury
was instructed to find the amount of the defendant's indebtedness to
the plaintiff, depending on whether the actual payee received the
proceeds of the check. Verdict for defendant.1 Held, no error. Bell
2

v. Murchison National Bank.
When a bank negligently pays a check without acquiring the
payee's indorsement, is it liable to the drawer for the loss?
The plaintiff's check ordered the drawee to pay a certain sum
to a person named as payee. So payment direct to the intended payee
or to his authorized agent discharged the drawee from liability to
the drawer.3 It seems that the same result would follow even if the
payee or his agent did not indorse. Indeed when the indorsement is
supplied, it does not make the drawee bank a purchaser but only serves
as a receipt to it.4 Thus the drawee can safely make payment to the
intended payee even though he is an imposter who obtained the check
from the drawer under an assumed name.5 It has also been held
1

It seems very likely from the charge and verdict that the jury may have
found the Mizner Development Corporation and the Boca Raton ReSales Corporation to have been substantially the same corporation, but from the record
there seems to be very creditable evidence from which they could have reasonably found to the contrary; i.e., the Boca Raton ReSales Corporation was a
secret corporation composed of employees of the payee corporation, its purpose being to defraud the payee by intercepting funds as they came in, all of
which suports the plaintiff's contention that the payee never received the
proceeds of the check.
2196 N. C. 233, 145 S. E. 241 (1928).
This rule is based on the theory of actual intent; i.e., the drawee has done
exactly what the drawer intended that it should do. Land Title and Trust Co.
v. Northwestern National Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 420, 50 L. R. A. 75,
79 A. S. R. 717 (1900) ; Hartford v. Greenwich Bank of N. Y., 142 N. Y. S. 387,
109 N. E. 1077 (1915) ; Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturer's Liability
and Ins. Co., 94 N. J. L. 152, 109 Atl. 296, 297 (1920).
'II MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING, (6th ed. 1928) §391, p. 847; Hart v.
Northwestern Trust and Savings Bank, 191 Ill. App. 396 (1915) ; (1929) 13
Minn. L. Rev. 309. But many banks now advertise, "Pay by check and be
sure of a receipt"; so those who use a check with such an intention might
reaso,-ably argue that the drawee owes them a duty to see that the payee does
*ndorse before receiving the proceeds. On the other hard it has been held that
the drawee cannot demand an indorsement from the payee as a condition of
payment. Osborne v. Gheen, 5 Mackey (16 D. C. Rep.) 189, affd. 136 U. S. 646
(1886); McCurdy v. Savings Society, 6 Ohio Dec. 1169, 11 Am. L. Rec. 156
(1882) which are favorably comented on in an exhaustive treatment of this
question in (1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 281, 290, 292. See Pickle v. People's
Nat'l Bank, 88 Tenn. 380, 12 S. W. 919 (1890). See Haldane v. Speirs, 10
Macph.
537 (Scot. Ct. of Sess. 1872), bearer cheque.
5
Karoly Electrical Construction Co. v. Globe Savings Bank, 64 Ill. App.
225 (1896) ; 22 A. L. R. 1228 (note) at 1230. Contra, Tolman v. American
National Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901).
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that the drawee is protected in paying on a forged indorsement provided the intended payee ultimately receives the proceeds. 6 Obviously, the purpose of an indorsement in such cases is not for the
protection of the drawer against a fraudulent payee.
Ordinarily, one who buys an order instrument without its being
properly indorsed by the payee takes it subject to all equities between
the drawer and the payee, 7 but the drawee merely pays the instrument out of the drawer's funds and is not subject to such equities.8
In view of the actual practice of banks in checking over the indorsements, a drawee is apparently negligent if it honors a check lacking
the payee's indorsement.9 If the recipient of the funds was an unauthorized holder, the bank is then liable to the payee, since the
drawee's negligence actually caused the loss.10 But in cases like the
one under comment, the dravwer's loss is caused solely by the fraud
of the payee, though in some cases the loss might be averted by the
drawee's exercising due care in obtaining the payee's indorsement. 1"
In the instant case, however, the drawee "disbursed the plaintiff's
funds" just as it would have done had the payee indorsed and thus
has done all that can be required of it. The relationship established
between the drawee and the drawer by the latter's deposit with the
' Beeson-Moore Stave Co. v. Clark Cbunty Bank, 160 Ark. 385, 254 S. W.
667 (1923); cf State v. First National Bank of Montrose, 203 Pa. 108, 52
At. 13 (1902) ; Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y. 487, 89
N. E. 1082 (1909).
'N 1. L. §49; Snow v. Boylston, 185 N. C. 314, 117 S. E. 299 (1923);
Conway v. Flaugh, 231 S. W. 1045 (Mo. App. 1921).
Cf cases cited in note 5 supra.
'Almost inevitably the omission is discovered and the bank returns the item,
with a printed card containing among many others the following reasons (for
return) "Indorsement missing," "Indorsement not correct" or "Indorsement
of Bank missing" etc., with the appropriate one marked. As a practical solution, the indorsement is usually supplied by the person or bank who received
it from the payee. Therefore, it is submitted that all banks should acquire from
their customers such authority as will enable them to supiply the customer's
indorsement when omitted by payee. This is already the prevailing practice in
large banking centers. The manner of indorsement consists of the bank
clerk's either (1) writing the payee's name on as payee would have donewhich is technically a forgery,'but not actually in view of the implied authorityor (2) stamping on the check a statement to the effect that the bank is crediting the payee's account and that the indorsement is "hereby supplied and
guaranteed." However, in the instant case, the payee's bank could not supply
the indorsement, but would rather return it to the Boca Raton ReSales Corporation for the indorsement.
"Dawson v. First National Bank of Greenville, 196 N. C. 134, 144 S. E.
833 (1928). For such negligence the bank should be held as a converter of
the check.
(1929) 7 N. C. L. Rev. 191.
11 Suppose in the principal case, plaintiff had discovered the payee's fraud
"shortly" after presentment of the check for payment. Then, if the drawee
had returned the check for the proper indorsement, the draxijer could have
stopped payment in due time to put the loss on the payee.
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-bank seems not to impose a duty of due care on the drawee, but rather
implies a contractual duty for it to pay absolutely in accordance
with the drawer's order.' 2
Therefore, if the drawee complied with this duty, it would not be
liable for the defrauded drawer's loss-even though in some cases
due care -by the drawee would have averted it, for the fundamental
cause of the loss was the fraud by the payee on the drawer.

J. B. LEwis,
CONFLICT OF LAws--JuRIscIoTIN

TO ANNUL

A MARRIAGE-

Does a North Carolina Superior Court have jurisdiction to annul on
the ground of infancy a marriage contracted in North Carolina by
parties domiciled in Virginia, the domicile still being in Virginia at
the time of the trial? The North Carolina Supreme Court recently
answered this affirmatively.1
This decision, as far as it goes, seems eminently sound, and keeps
in mind the distinction between a proceeding to annul a marriage and
one for divorce. The former is based on conditions existing at the
time of the marriage ceremony, and contends there never was a valid
marriage. The latter admits there was a valid marriage and seeks
to have the marital relation terminated because of conditions arising
subsequently to the marriage.2 The annulment declares the marriage void ab inltio and bastardizes the issue and effaces all the incidents of the marriage relation, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary.3 A divorce terminates the marriage as of the date of its
rendition.
Some courts hold that domicile is as indispensable for annulment as for divorce. 4 This seems unsound, for the courts of the
"WOOD, BYLs ON
BANKS AND BANKING

BILLS AND NoTs (8th ed. 1891) §18, p. 62; II MoRsE,
(6th ed. 1928) §453, p. 997; Central National Bank v.
National Metropolitan Bank, 31 D. C. App. 391, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520,
522 (1908); Peabody v. Citizens State Bank, 98 Minn 302, 108 N. W. 272,
274 (1906); Wiley v. Bunker Hill National Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 67 N. E.
655 (1903) ; Boney v. Bank of Rose Hill, 190 N. C. 863, 129 S. E. 583 (1925) ;
Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 53, 2 N. E. 881 (1885); London
Joint Stock Bank v. MacMillan, (1918) A. C. 777, 119 L. T. N. S. 387, 388;
2 A. L. R. 175 (note).
'Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N. C. 697, 146 S. E. 864 (1929).
2ScHOULER,

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION,

AND

DoMEsTIc RELATIONS,

1412. For an able discussion of the whole problem discussed in this comment,

see Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage, 32 Harv. Law Rev. 806, 807
(1919).
3BIsHop, MARrAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, Par. 277; 2 Ibid. 1602;
supra: note 2.
'Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35 (1882); Dxcz,, CONFLICT or LAws, (2 ed.) 268.
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state in which the marriage contract was performed certainly should
have jurisdiction to declare the marriage void. Indeed some courts
hold that only such courts have jurisdiction. 5 Would the North
Carolina courts thus limit the relief granted? The Restatement of
Conflict of Laws apparently adopts this view. 6 This is based on the
theory that an action for annulment is a proceeding in rem, the
marriage status constituting the res. What the forum has to decide
is not what the law of the place of entering into the contract consisted
of or was, but what it did, that is, did it create a res, a marriage status,
and only the courts of the place of entering into the contract can
decide that. The theory is thus stated by one of its exponents: "...
It seems impossible to conceive of international law as insisting that
one sovereign shall allow another to determine for him what his. acts
have been, . . . the question -beingwhether or not he has done some-

thing."' 7 This argument is logically unassailable, but its pragmatic
efficacy is more doubtful. To require the parties to return to the
place of performance of the marriage ceremony in order to have
it annulled would be needlessly inconvenient. Then too, how could
the plaintiff force the defendant to appear in such a court unless the
defendant voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction? Must the forum
have personal jurisdiction of the defendant, or is annulment a proceeding in rem, not involving the defendant personally? When
does the court have control over the res, the marriage status, so as to
enter a decree that would permanently change it? These are only
a few of the many questions such a holding would entail.
The English courts allow their own courts jurisdiction when the
respondent is resident in England 8 and also when the marriage is
celebrated there.9 They are somewhat inconsistent, however, in not
recognizing a foreign decree of annulment if the marriage took place
in England.' 0
"Note, 26 Harv. Law Rev. 253; Levy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E.
638 (1913).
Restatement No. 2, §121, illustrations a and b.

'Supra note 5.

'Supra note 2; Dicay, CoNILIcr oF LAws, (3d ed.) 300. As to domicile,
the parties being married elsewhere, see Bonaparte v. Bonaparte (1892)
Prob. Div. 402; Bater v. Bater (1906) Prob. Div. 209. Under the English
decisions it is obvious that the residence of the plaintiff is not always necessary, but of course he is personally present in court. The residence of the
respondent is required in order to give the court personal jurisdiction over
such party.
'Linke v. Van Aerde, 10 T. L. R. 426.
"Ogden v. Ogden (1908) Prob. Div. 46, 78 et seq.
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Modem legislation has largely abolished all practical distinctions
between annulment and divorce." Why not incorporate the causes
for annulment under the divorce statutes and have the same jurisdictional requirements for each, thus allowing the courts of the
domicile jurisdiction for annulment? A provision should be made
exempting the plaintiff from residence requirements in an action
for annulment, 12 and also one giving jurisdiction to annul to the
courts of the place of entering into the marriage without regard
to domicile, as held in the principal case. The Uniform Divorce and
Annulment Statute would allow the action to be brought where either
party is resident, and allow service -by publication upon absent defendant.13 Such a statute seems desirable.
J. WInFmIL

CREW, JR.

CRIMINAL LAW-SELF-DEFENSE-DUTY TO RETREAT-REASONABLENESS OF THE APPEARANCE OF NEcEsSITY-Defendant, in the
recent case of State v. Dills, 196 N. C. 457 (1929), pleaded selfdefense to an indictment for murder. The jury were charged that,
even if the assault were murderous, defendant could not be acquitted
if he could have retreated with safety. A conviction of second degree
murder was reversed and the case remanded for new trial, on the
ground that no duty to retreat exists where there is actually, or
reasonably appears to -be, a felonious assault that creates an actual
or reasonably apparent necessity to kill the assailant.
The court's holding is in line with the majority of cases on the
point in this jurisdiction. In any case the assailed can kill only
from necessity.' But, if the assault is felonious, that is, one which
' Impotency and pregnancy are now made grounds for divorce. N. C.
Con. Stat. §1659. The issue of such marriage is no longer bastardized. Taylor
v. White, 160 N. C. 38, 41, 75 S. E. 941 (1912). The question as to whether
the marriage is void ab initio or from the date of the decree is thus more academic than practical.
"'The purpose of such residence requirement in an action for divorce is "to
prevent hasty action for divorce and to give the parties opportunity for reconciliation." Taylor v. White, supra note 11. In annulment it would seem to
be for the interest of all concerned that such relations be terminated as soon
as possible.
"TERRY, UNIFORM STATE LAws, 279 §6, et. seq.
'The cases abound with statements that the killing must be ex necessitate.

E.g., in the principal case it is said, "But to have the benefit of this doctrine
the must show that he was free from blame and that he took life only when it
was necessary or apparently necessary to save his own life or to protect himself from great bodily harm." See also S. v. Blevins, infra n. 10.
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is in fact,2 or reasonably appears to be,3 calculated to kill or bodily
maim, he may stand his ground and, if necessary, kill his assailant.
,5
If, however, the assault is 4 or reasonably appears to be non-felonious,
or if the assailed were in fault in provoking the affray or engaged
in a mutual combat, 6 then he must retreat before taking life se defendendo. From the facts as they appeared to the assailed at the time,
the jury are to say whether his appraisal of the nature of the assault
was reasonable and the appearance of a necessity to avert its consequences by killing likewise reasonable. 7
The view of-the trial court finds support in a majority of the
8
American jurisdictions, which, except in one situation, make the
privilege of killing in self-defense conditfonal on the performance of
a precedent duty to retreat when and as long as it is consistent with
the safety of the assailed. A line of cases in this jurisdiction propounds the same doctrine. 9
'S. v. Lucas 164 N. C. 471, 79 S. E. 674 (1913). Assault with an open
knife, assailant avowing his intent to kill.
'S. v. Hough 138 N. C. 663, 50 S. E. 709 (1905). Assailant, much larger

physically than defendant, approached him rolling up his sleeves "looking
mad and showing fight." See also S. v. Gaddy 166 N. C. 341, 81 S. E. 608
(1914), fistic assault on a cripple and statement by Holmes, Jr., ii Brown v.
United States, 256 U. S. 335, 343, 65 L. ed. 961, 41 S. Ct. 501 (1921), "Detached
reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."
'S. v. Scott 26 N. C. 409 (1844). Deceased struck at defendant with his
fist. Defendant stabbed him to death.
"S. v. Kennedy 91 N. C. 573 (1884). Assault with a brick in an open field,
assailant slackening his pace as he approached.
oS. v. Robertson 166 N. C. 356, 81 S. E. 689 (1914).
SS. v. Dixon 75 N. C. 275 (1876). It makes no difference that subsequent
events may show that the assault was not in fact felonious. S. v. Clark 134

N. C. 698, 47 S. E. 36 (1903).

"Killing in defense of habitation. 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49. See also S. v.
Harman 78N. C. 515 (1878), cf. S. v. Askew 94 Ala. 4, 33 Am. St. Rep. 84,
10 So. 657.
'In S. v. Kennedy supra, after holding that the assault was non-felonious,
the court said, "There may be cases, though they are rare and of dangerous
application, ivhere a man in personal conflict may kill his assailant without
retreating to the wall. The assault in such case must have been so fierce
as not to allow the person assailed to yield at all without manifest danger
to his life, or of enormous bodily harm; then if there be no other way of saving
his life, or avoiding such.harm, he may kill his adversary instantly." In S. v.
Gentry 125 N. C. 733, 34 S. E. 706 (1889), which was an assault with a knife
in an open road, the jury were charged that defendant could kill only "if

the fierceness and suddenness of the attack were such that he could not retreat
with safety." The charge was approved, and it was further said that the rule
of S. v. Dixon supra should be limited solely to an assault in one's habitation.
Montgomery, J., dissented on the ground that the trial court's charge was a
departure from the no-retreat rule as established by S. v. Dixon and S. v.
Matthews 78 N. C. 534 (1878). The Kennedy and Gentry cases were cited
and approved in S. v. Lilliston 141 N. C. 858, 54 S. E. 427 (1906) and in S. v.
Walker 145 N. C. 569, 59 S. E. 1048 (1908), but see dissenting opinions by
Connor and Walker JJ.
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Where no avenue of escape is apparent or available with impunity,
there can be little difference in the effect of the two doctrines, but that
of the instant case permits the jury to test the reasonableness of the
apparent necessity to kill in this situation on the same ground that
it tests it when the assailed could withdraw without increasing his
hazard.' 0 Can it appear reasonably necessary to kill when a perfect
escape can be effected? This categorical exclusion of the element
of retreat in determining the reasonableness of the conduct of the
assailed is, it is submitted, a perversion of the reason underlying the
doctrine of self-defense. It does not prevent the taking of life,
but it may quite conceivably facilitate it.
J. H. CHADBOURN.
DAMAGES-BREACH OF INDEFINITE TIME CONTRACT-DATE OF
BREACH AS TIME FOR MEASURING COST OF PERFORMANCE-In 1916,

the -parties to a recent North Carolina case,' entered into an agreement of indefinite duration, by which the defendant was to buy all
the timber on the plaintiffs land. The plaintiff by the agreement
was to cut and deliver the lumber to the defendant's siding, there to
be scaled and the price ascertained at the market rate. Both parties
continued under the contract until 1923 when the defendant repudiated, leaving the plaintiff with half the timber uncut. The case came
to trial in 1928. Held, damages were to be settled and ascertained
according to the existing state of the market at the time the breach
occurred, and not at the time for performance.
The purpose of the law in awarding damages for a breach of
contract is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would hme
been had the defendant duly performed. 2 This in the instant case
would be the difference between the worth of the plaintiff's timber
plus the cost of labor and material that it would take to put it in a
marketable condition, and the price to be paid by the defendant.
While this measure of damages seems to be almost universal in its
application, 3 the authorities are in conflict as to the time of applying
it. Where the contract is a continuing one, which at the time of the
" "In either case (felonious or ordinary assault), he can only kill from necessity. But, in the one, he can have that necessity determined in view of the
fact that he has a right to stand his ground; in the other, he must show as one
feature of the necessity that he has retreated to the wall."

S. v. Blevins 138

N. C. 668, 50 S. E. 763 (1905).
'McCall v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 196 N. C. 597, 146 S. E. 579 (1929).
'Steel Co. v. Copeland, 159 N. C. 556, 75 S. E. 1002 (1912); (1924) 1
N. C. L. Rev. 59; SFnwcic, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §607.
'See collection of cases in note (1926) 44 A. L. R. p. 251.
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breach has been partly performed, and the cost of performance on
both sides is subject to fluctuation, some courts hold, that if the trial
comes on before time for performance has fully elapsed, the prices
actually obtaining during the period intervening between breach and
the trial will measure the cost of performance which would have occurred during that period, and the prices current at the time of trial
may be considered as indicative of the probable cost of future performance. 4 If, on the other hand, the time for full performance has
elapsed before trial, the actual value of the performance will be
known and will be the measure of the cost of performance. 5 This
doctrine seems to be followed in North Carolina, where the contract
is definite as to the time6 but not where the time for performance is
uncertain. Here the court holds, that in estimating what the performance would cost, the prices at the time of the breach should
govern, 7 but the jury in fixing the amount of a present recovery for
prospective damages should make allowance for the fluctuations likely
8
to occur.

It is difficult to see why the North Carolina Court should allow
the actual facts as they exist at the time of the trial to be shown as
to the cost of performance where the time is definite, and not in the
case of a contract indefinite as to time. In the latter situation, the jury
"Hagan v. Nashville Trust Co., 124 Tenn. 93, 136 S. W. 993 (1911) ; Shoemaker v. Archer, 116 Cal. 239, 48 Pac. 62 (1897) ; SEmwGcK, DAMAGES (9th ed.
1920) §636j.

'Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N. W. 232 (1883) ; Hagan v. Nashville Trust Co., 124 Tenn. 93, 136 S. W. 993 (1911) ; Emerson v. Pacific Coast
and Packing Co., 96 Minn. 1, 104 N. W. 573, 113 Am. St. Rep. 603, 1 L. R. A.

N. S. 445 (1905). Cases collected: SUTHEMAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916)
§120; cf. commission agencies cases, Wakeman v. Wheeler and Wilson Co.,
101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. 264, 54 Am. Rep. 676 (1886) ; Northwest Auto Co. v.
Harmon 250 Fed. 832 (1918) ; Randal v. Motor Co., 212 Mass. 352, 99 N. E.
221 (1912); cf. also contracts for personal support, Freeman v. Fogg, 82
Me. 408, 19 Atl. 907 (1890). If person to be supported dies before trial and
case is continued by personal representative, it has been held that the cost of
support during actual life is recoverable, Baughan v. Brown, 122 Ind. 115,.
23 N. E. 695 (1890).
'Bryant v. The Southern Box and Lumber Co., 192 N. C. 607, 135 S. E.
531, (1926).
"Wilkinson v. Dunbar, 149 N. C. 20, 62 S. E. 748 (1908); Hawkes v.
The Pine Lumber Co., 149 N. C. 10, 62_ S. E. 752 (1908). These cases follow
as to the time for computing damages, the doctrine laid down in Masterton v.
The Mayor, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 61, 42 Am. Dec. 48 (1845), which apparently
has not been followed in New York: St. Regis P. Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber
Company, 173 N. Y. 149, 65 N. E. 967 (1903); Windmuller v. Pope, 107
N. Y. 674, 14 N. E. 436 (1887); Segal v. Fimlay, 213 N. Y. S. 540 (1925);
SEowGIcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §636j.
SWilkinson v. Dunbar, 149 N. C. 20, 62 S. E. 748 (1908).
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may take into consideration the probable fluctuations of the market.0
It would seem that in both cases the more practical and simple
rule would be to allow the jury to find what would have been the
probable cost to the plaintiff of performing his side of the bargain
in the light of the actual range of prices subsequent to the breach.
N. S. SOWERS.
OR SUccESsivE RECOvERIES FOR

DAMAGES-NUiSANCE-SINGLE
PERMANENT

AND

CONTINUING

NUISANCES

AND

TRESPASSES-In

Wharton v. Empire Manufacturing Co.' the plaintiff recovered tem-

porary and 'permanent damages for the negligent ponding of water
on his land by the defendant. On appeal, the judgment was reversed
on two grounds: (1) Error in the submission of the issue of permanent damages; (2) error in the refusal to sign the judgment for
temporary damages only, which was tendered by the defendant on
the basis of his offer to abate any nuisance under the direction of the
court.

The courts of the country are in irreconcilable conflict as to the
proper measure of damages to be awarded against a defendant
who on his own land erects a permanent structure which injures
the land of. another. Most jurisdictions recognize the general rule
that, where the injury is permanent, the plaintiff may recover future
or prospective, as well as past, damages; but that, where the nuisance
is of a temporary, recurrent, or removable character, prospective or
future damages are not recoverable. 2 Lack of harmony is seen in
the attempts of the courts to determine what injuries are permanent. Some courts have adopted the rule that injuries to land caused
'by permanent structures which in the normal course of things will
continue indefinitely, and which will undergo no change from any

cause but human labor, create but one cause of action, and that it is
proper to assess damages in one action for both the past and the
future injuries to the land.3 Other courts, looking more to the nature
'Perhaps this is based upon the difficulty of ascertaining when the deliveries
are to be made under the indefinite contract and hence what fluctuations are to

be considered; but this the jury could fairly estimate, in the light of past

performance.

1196 N. C. 719, 146 S. E. 867 (1929).

'Denver City Irrigation and Water Co. v. Middaugh, 12 Colo. 434, 21 Pac.
565, 13 Am. St. Rep. 234 and note (1889); City of Albany v. Jackson, 33
Ga. App. 30, 125 S. E. 478 (1924) ; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Loeb, 118 I1.
203, 8 N. E. 460 (1884); Ridley v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co., 118 N. C. 996, 24
S. E. 730, 22 L. R. A. 708 (1896); Nashville v. Comer, 88 Tenn. 415, 12
S. W. 1027, 7 L. R. A. 465 (1890); 3 Sx~wwicic, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920)
§924.
, Stodghill v. The C. B. & Q. R. Co., 53 Iowa 341, 5 N. W. 495 (1880);
Troy v. Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H. 83, 55 Am. Dec. 177 (1851); Norfolk
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of the injury than to the character of the structure, declare that the
law 'will not presume that one will continue to injure the land of
another, and hence that the continuing injury is made up of a succession of 'wrongs, for which successive actions will lie.4 Broadly,
it may be said that North Carolina has adopted the view of the second group.5 Various other tests of the permanency of the nuisance
have been suggested. 6 In suits for temporary damages recovery
normally may be had only for damages occasioned within the period
of the statute of limitations and prior to the commencement of the
action;7 in North Carolina, however, damages are awarded to the
8
time of the trial.
Where the plaintiff's property has been injured by the maintenance
of public or semi-public enterprises which cannot properly be abated
because of public interest, it is generally held that all damages must
County Water Co. v. Etheridge, 120 Va. 379, 91 S. E. 133, note 4 Va. L. Rev.
503 (1917); 1 SmaxwiciK, op. cit. supra note 2, §95.
'Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Compton, 142 Ill. 511, 32 N. E. 693 (1892), L. R.
A. 1916 E. 1013, note 31; Bartlett v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 92 W. Va. 445,
115 S. E. 451, 27 A. L. R. 54 (1922) ; Lyon v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 146 S. E.
57 (W. Va. 1928).
5
v. Deberry, 2 N. C. 248 (1795) ; Bradley v. Amis, 3 N. C. 399
(1806) ; Ridley v. Seaboard & R. R. Co., supra note 2, at 998; Webb v. The
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 662, 87 S. E. 633, L. R. A. 1916
E. 971 (1915), the leading North Carolina case. In the last case it is said:
"But in cases strictly of private ownership the weight of authority seems to be
that separate actions must be brought for the continuing or recurrent wrong-."
Cited with approval are cases which support the proposition that injuries caused
by the manner of operating a private, legal enterprise give rise to a right to
successive actions as each injury occurs, because the cause of the injury is illegal
and abatable; and, hence, that permanent damages are not recoverable. The
passage above quoted appears in the main case, so this appears to be the North
Carolina rule to-day. See Ragan v. Thomasville, 196 N. C. 260, 145 S. E.
243 (1928) ; Winchester v. Byers, 196 N. C. 383, 145 S. E. 774 (1928).
' See annotation L. R. A. 1916 E. 997, where the nuisance is considered in the
light of (1) the presumption from illegality, (2) its physical characteristics, (3)
the certainty and obviousness of future injuries, and (4) the defendant's intention; Charles T. McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land (1924)
37 Harv. L. Rev. 574, 591, gives the following criterea: (1) the durability of the
offending structure, (2) "the certainty and obviousness of future injuries,"
(3) the effect on the plaintiff's land, as to whether it works a continuous or
intermittent physical change, (4) the comparative expense of abating the
nuisance and of paying off the plaintiff's claims.
'The rule at common law. Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 188 Ind.
400, 123 N. E. 789 (1919) ; 4 SEDGWICK, op. cit. supra note 2, §1256 (i).
' Ridley v. Seaboard & R. R. Co., supra note 2; Webb v. The VirginiaCarolina Chemical Co., supra note 5, where it is stated that, under the code,
the equity rule has been adopted; 1 SEnsWICK, op. cit. supra note 2, §91, note
83. This is the rule which appears in the main case.
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be assessed in one action.9 The North Carolina rule is that permanent damages may be given at the election of either party.' 0
It is clear that everywhere, in cases against private enterprises,
an issue of permanent damages may be submitted by the consent of
the parties, although the nuisance complained of be a recurrent one. 1
In the normal case of injury resulting from the maintenance of a
private nuisance, the right of the injured party to elect whether he will
recover temporary or permanent damages has not been considered
-by the courts. Although a direct holding is lacking, it seems that in
North Carolina a plaintiff would have no such election. 12 There is a
'10 SmGwicK, op. cit. supra note 2, §95.
" White v. Northwestern N. C. R. Co., 113 N. C. 610, 622, 18 S. E. 330
(1893); Ridley v. Seaboard & R. R. Co., supra note 2; Rhodes v. Durham,
165 N. C. 679, 81 S. E. 938 (1914) ; Webb v. The Virginia-Carolina Chemical
Co., supra note 5. It is interesting to note here the statutory provision for
the assessment of permanent damages against railroads: "No suit . . . shall be
brought or maintained against a railroad company for damages caused by the
construction of the road, or the repairs thereto, unless such suit ... is commenced within five years after the cause of action accrues, and the jury shall
assess the entire amount of damages which the party aggrieved is entitled to
recover by reason of the trespass on 'his property." N. C. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
(1919), or N. C. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1927), §440 (2). This provision for the
assessment of permanent damages is compulsory, Beaseley v. Aberdeen & R. R.
Co., 147 N. C. 362, 61 S. E. 453 (1908), but its effect is restricted to railroad
companies, Teeter v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 172 N. C. 783, 90 S. E. 941 (1916).
Even in respect to railroads, if the injury is caused by the negligent failure to

properly maintain the road, such as keeping open culverts and the like, the

statute does not apply, and damages are assessable as in the normal case of
legally abatable nuisances. Perry v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 171 N. C. 38,
87 S. E. 948 (1916).
'Langley v. Staley Hosiery Mills Co., 194 N. C. 644, 140 S. E. 440 (1927);
Thackeray v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 Pac. 813 (1924);
see annotation (1922) 27 A. L. R. 61.
"In Webb v. The Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., sutra note 5, the following is given as a test by which to determine the right of the plaintiff, at his
election, to recover permanent damages: "-whether the wrongful act is single
and entire, though causing subsequent and continuous injury, or whether a
defendant wrongfully continues and maintains the conditions which result in
continued or recurring damages." In an earlier case, Brown v. The VirginiaCarolina Chemical Co., 165 N. C. 421, 81 S. E. 463 (1914), involving the same
defendant, the question of whether the plaintiff had an election to recover permanent damages was left in doubt, the court adding: "The cases in which that
principle has been thus far allowed to prevail in this state are those where it was
established expressly by statute or where the injuries arose from structures or
conditions permanent in their nature and their continued maintenance was
protected and guaranteed by the statutory power of eminent domain,-or because the interest of the public in this continued existence was of such an
exigent nature that the right of the individual owner was of necessity and to
that extent subordinated to the public good." This is quoted with approval
in Langley v. Staley, supra note 11, at 645, as is the passage quoted from Webb
v. The Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. supra note 5. The inference is irresistible that in cases of private ownership "separate actions must be brought for
the continuing or recurrent wrong."
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strong and convincing argument that this alternative should be rerecognized. 13
Unquestionably, where the nuisance has been abated before tril
there can be no recovery of prospective damages as for a permanent nuisance.1 4
CHARLES P. RousE.
EQUITY-JURISDICTION

TO

PROTECT

POLITICAL

RIGHTS-PARTY

PRImmaES-A candidate for a party nomination brought suit to enjoin the party committee from declaring the result of the primary election on the grounds that illegal votes had been received and that his
opponent was not qualified to hold the office in question. Held, that
questions as to irregularity of the election or as to qualifications of
voters or candidates in a primary election are necessarily political and
since courts of equity will not protect a purely political right, the

injunction should be denied. Avery v. Hale, 145 S. E. 76 (Ga. 1928).
The case is in accord with many decisions from other jurisdictions. On the ground that equity will not interfere to protect a political right, protection of the right of a citizen to vote or to be voted
"In giving permanent damages for the depreciation of the market value
of the plaintiff's land, the courts measure a prospective loss. In the future
the nuisance may become an advantage rather than a detriment, or it may be
abated altogether; but, where the circumstances point to an "indefinitely long"
continuance of the nuisance, the plaintiff is subjected to a loss of opportunity
to sell his land at its proper value. Such a damaging result is ordinarily considered as a present loss. In this situation only reasonable probability of indefinite continuance should be made a prerequisite, as in other actions for prospective damages, to the plaintiff's recovery in one action. The defendant
should be allowed to show that continued future damage is not probable,
in absence of proof of which fact it would not be unreasonable to assess
-him for permanent damages. The plaintiff's normal recovery would still be
by successive actions for damage as it actually accrues, but he would have
the option to end the controversy in one action. "subject to two requirements:
(1) that he, in effect, tender to the defendant an easement to continue the
damaging condition by seeking compensation upon the basis of the indefinite
continuance of the nuisance; and (2) that he prove a reasonable probability
of its indefinite continuance." "If the 'elective' theory be adopted," it would
seem just that the plaintiff's action for permanent damages should never be
barred by lapse of time, short of the prescriptive period, so long as the nuisance
continues. Charles T. McCormick, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 594-599. This
article fully discusses the entire problem here under consideration.
"Foote v. Burlington Water Co., 94 Iowa 200, 62 N. W. 648 (1895).
To confine recovery to temporary damages, the defendant may plead and prove
that he intends shortly to remove the nuisance. Hughes v. General Electric
Light, etc., Co., 107 Ky. 485, 54 S. W. 723 (1900). The plaintiff may be limited
to a recovery of temporary damages, as a result of agreement with the defendant for abatement by the latter. Peacock v. City of Greensboro, 196 N. C.
416, 146 S. E. 3 (1928).
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for at an election,' or his right to 'be a candidate for or to be elected
to an office 2 is held not to be within the jurisdiction of a court of
equity. Nor can equity restrain the holding of an election or direct
the mode in which, or determine the rules of law in pursuance of
which an election shall be held.3 When, in violation of party rules,
a party chairman fills vacancies in a committee with persons not
duly elected, 4 or where a person duly elected is refused membership
on a party committee, 5 or where a public officer is wrongfully
removed, 6 equity will not take jurisdiction. Nor will it, at the instance
of a candidate for nomination, enjoin party officials from tabulating,
publishing or certifying results of the elections 7 even though fraud is
alleged.
There is, however, a line of cases to the effect that where statutes
regulate elections, equity will take jurisdiction of political rights
arising thereunder. A party committee attempting to make nomination in violation of a statute, 8 or to call an election at a date earlier
than that provided for by statute, 9 or to hold a primary under rules
and regulations essentially different from the requirements of a statute
will -be enjoined. The theory of these cases is that a political right
'becomes a "legal" right when it is regulated by statute and as such,
is no longer within the rule that courts of equity have no jurisdiction to protect mere political rights. It is submitted that the existence
of a statute presents no logical ground for distinction in the case.
The quality of a right is determined not by its creator, but by its
kind and character.
The rule that only rights of property are within the jurisdiction
of courts of equity has no more legitimate basis than an "unintelligent adherence to the dicta of a great judge" in an early English
case.' 0 Historically, courts of equity were seldom called upon to
'Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475 (1903) ; Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ili. 41, 37
N. E. 683 (1894). See note (1929) 7 Tex. L. R. 430.
'Winnet v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 99 N. W. 681 (1904).
'Green v. Mills, 69 Fed. 852 (C. C. A. 4th. 1895).
v. Howley, 188 Pa. 116, 41 Atl. 273, 42 L. R. A. 235 (1898).
'Kearns
5

McKane v. Dem. General Committee, 123 N. Y. 609, 25 N. E. 1057 (1890).
'In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888).
'Walls v. Brundidge, 109 Ark. 250, 160 S. W. 230 (1913); Brown v. Board
of Elections, 176 N. C. 63, 96 S. E. 659 (1918).
' Gilmore v. Waples, 108 Tex. 167, 188 S. W. 1037 (1916).
*Egan v. Greive, 112 Ky. 232, 65 S. W. 437 (1901) ;

Brown v. Republican

County Committee, 119 Ky. 720, 68 S. W. 622 (1902); Neal v. Young, 75

S. W. 1082 (Ky. 1903); Brown v. Cole, 54 Misc. Rep. 278, 104 N. Y. S. 109

(1907).

"Pound, Equitable Relief Againt Defamation and Injuries to Personality,
29 Harv. L. Rev. 640, 641 (1916). And see (1927) 25 Mich. L. R. 889.
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protect rights other than property rights and this, no doubt, accounts
for the early dicta. The doctrine that equity is conversant only with
property rights is aTbitrary; and, as a matter of fact, while avowing
adherence, courts of equity have often disregarded it."'
There are noteworthy objections, however, to the protection of
political rights. A political situation may be complex, demanding
much of the court's time, and, conceivably, the situation may be such
that the court would be embarrassed in administering a remedy by
the danger of undertaking an impossible task. Rights may be small
as compared with the time and trouble necessary to protect them.
Interference by the courts may result in dragging them constantly
into the arena of party politics.' 2 The refusal of a court of equity
to hear a party dispute may sometimes be justifiable upon the ground
that parties have tribunals of their own for the settlement of their
disputes.' 3 Some courts have drawn an analogy between political
parties and voluntary associations, in regard to which, courts have
divided as to the requirement that members have rights in the asso4
ciation's property.'
The remedy at law is adequate in some situations. A proceeding
in the nature of quo warranto determines title to a public office
between rival claimants when one is in possession under a claim of
right and in the performance of official duties.' 5 In this proceeding,
a claimant may show that unlawful votes were received for his
opponent ;t6 orhe may investigate the correctness of the result of the
election as declared by the election .board.1 Mandamus lies to
compel a public officer to perform a ministerial duty imposed upon
him by law. So a board of elections which has refused to place the
name of a candidate on a ticket as required of them by law,' 8 or
has refused to certify the returns to the proper officials 19 is subject
to the writ. There are many situations, however, where quo warranto
and mandamus are inadequate. Quo warranto can be of no service
to a candidate for a party nomination, for the -winner of the primary
' Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 Yale L. J.
115 (1923); Equity, 21 C. J. 154.
' Green v. Mills, supra note 3.
"Winnet v. Adams, supra note 5. Compare note (1914) 14 Col. L. R. 243.
"'Kearns v. Howley, supra note 6. See also, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 354; Walls v.
Brundidge, supra note 9; and Comment (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 368.
'SHarkrader
v. Lawrence,
C. 441,
E. 35 (1925).
"State v. Carter,
194 N. C.190293,N. 139
S. E.130
604 S.(1927).
"Barnett v. Midgett, 151 N. C. 1, 65 S. E. 441 (1907).
"'Johnston v. Board of Elections, 172 N. C. 162, 90 S. E. 143 (1916).
"Bell v. Board of Flections, 188 N. C. 311, 124 S. E. 311 (1924).
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succeeds to no public office, the title to which may be adjudicated. 2 0
Upon application for a writ of mandamus, a court cannot inquire into
questions of fraud and illegality nor may mandamus be employed to
settle conflicting claims to office. 2 1 Its office is only to compel the
performance of a dear-cut duty, imposed -by law. It is available only
against a public officer -and where ministerial duties have not been
placed upon party officials by statute, the writ will be denied. An
action at law for damages seldom if ever affords an adequate remedy
for the violation of political rights. As regards a person who has
been wrongfully refused the right to run for a party nomination,
damages afford no remedy whatever. Success in the primary and also
in the general election must be shown before a case for damages is
22
made out; speculative damages are not recoverable.
Then, unless courts of equity take cognizance of rights of candidates and nominees in party primaries, such rights are often left
unprotected and unenforced. The difficulties of enforcing a decree,
the impolicy of becoming involved in politics, the time required for
the proper adjudication of political disputes, and the possibility of
obtaining a remedy in party tribunals or in courts of law are all, of
course, matters which should be taken into consideration. Unless a
right is insignificant as compared with the objections applicable, it
would seem that the individual and public interest in the specific
enforcement of the right should be paramount. Discretion should
be vested in the court permitting it -to decide upon the propriety of
taking jurisdiction of each case. But denial by courts of equity of
the use of its tribunals to adjudicate matters of election should never
rest upon the groundless assertion that equity takes cognizance of
property rights only.
J. N. SMITH.
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT TO CONVEY WIFE'S

PROPERirY ENFORCIBLE AGAINST HUSBAND-In a recent

North

Carolina decision' the vendee sued for specific performance and
damages following breach of a contract to convey realty signed by
vendor and wife. The action for specific performance was non-suited
because it appeared that title to the property was in the wife, whose
privy examination had never been taken. On the action for damages
"Bell v. Board of Elections, supra note 19.
' Britt v. Board of Canvassers, 172 N. C. 797, 90 S. E. 1005 (1916).
'

24 et seq.
Colwell v. O'Brien, 196 N. C. 508, 146 S. E. 142 (1929).

' SEDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF THE LAw oF DAMAGES, p.
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there was verdict and judgment for fifty cents, from which the plainHeld: judgment of non-suit reversed and new trial
tiff appealed.
awarded-that conceding specific performance could not be had
against the wife there was no reason why the husband should not be
required to convey his interest in the property and be held in damages
along with his wife for the deficiency in the title.
Three general types of relief have been given when a purchaser
sues for specific performance of a contract for the conveyance, of
lands in which the vendor's wife2 refuses to join.3 One group of
cases decrees specific performance only upon payment of the full
purchase price, refusing an abatement for the outstanding dower
interest-being based on fear of coercion on the wife, 4 the difficulty of ascertaining compensation, 5 and the notion that the court
cannot make a new contract for the parties.8 This view is unfair
to the purchaser, and narrows the market of the vendor-husband.
A second group grants specific performance with a portion of the
purchase price retained by the vendee or deposited with the court as
indemnity, the courts splitting on allowance of interest. 7 Provided
interest is given, this would seem the better view, in that it permits
'Protection of the dower right is a generally recognized principle of the law.

'For an excellent discussion of the subject see Horack, Specific Performance

and Dower Rights (1926) 11 Iowa L. R. 97. Also, Pomeroy, Equity Juris-

prudence, 4th Ed. (1918) §§458-463; Clark, Equitable Principles (1919)
§154; Annotation (1926) 46 A. L. R. 748; 36 Cyc. 743; Am. Dig. Sys., Specific
Performance, key-number 10(2).
"Barbour v. Hickey, 2 App. D. C. 207 (1894) ; Reilly v. Cullinane, 53 App.
17, 287 Fed. 994 (1923) ; Riesz's Appeal, 73 Pa. 485 (1873) ; Bahl v. Menger,
283 Pa. 508, 129 AtI. 459 (1925) ; Harden v. Falls, 115 Va. 779, 80 S. E. 576
(1914).
'Reilly v. Cullinane, supra note 4; Riesz's Appeal, supra note 4; Rosenow v.
Miller, 63 Mont. 451, 207 Pac. 618 (1922), the Montana Statute giving certain
elections to the wife as to what she will take on death of husband.
'Barbour v. Hickey, supra note 4; Reilly v. Cullinane, supra note 4; Riesz's
Appela, supra note 4; Kuratli v. Jackson, 60 Ore. 203, 118 Pac. 192, 1013 (1911).
In general see, Long v. Chandler, 10 Del. Ch. 339, 92 Atl. 256 (1914) ; Cowan
v. Kane, 211 Ill. 572, 71 N. E. 1097 (1904); Tebeau v. Ridge, 261 Mo. 547,
170 S. W. 871 (1914) ; Milam v. Williams, 73 W. Va. 467, 80 S. E. 770 (1914) ;
Dunsmore v. Lyle, 87 Va. 391, 12 S. E. 610 (1891), that sale subject to wife's
dower interest not contemplated by parties. People's Saving Bank Co. v.
Parisette, 68 Ohio St. 450, 67 N. E. 896 (1903), that wife's dower interest
being an incumbrance is not covered by a covenant of warranty. New Jersey
varies, abatement being denied if refusal of wife to join was her own voluntary act, Bateman v. Riley, 72 N. J. Eq. 316, 73 Atl. 1006 (1906) ; Kopuski
v. Wira, 98 N. J. Eq. 377, 129 AtI. 185 (1925); But see Young v. Paul, 10
N. J. Eq. 401, 414 (1855), husband procured wife's refusal-specific performance
with complete indemnity allowed. In accord, Stein v. Francis, 91 N. J. Eq.
205, 109 Atl. 737 (1919).
'In general, see Horack, supra note 3. Springle's Heirs v. Shields, 17 Ala.
295 (1850) and Minge v. Green, 176 Ala. 343, 58 So. 381 (1912), allowing interest. Leach v. Forrney, 21 Iowa 271 (1866) and Butler v. Butler, 151 Iowa
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subsequent adjustments dependent on the time of death, and the marketability of the title is no more impaired than in the other two cases.
The third group allows specific performance with a deduction from
the price, based on the mortality tables.8 This is the North Carolina
view. 9 Its application often works an undue hardship on either the
vendor or vendee, as the wife may die immediately, or, conversely,
may outlive the husband by many years, and use of mortality tables
is based upon a general average of life, while fairness in abatement
cases depends upon the length of the particular life involved.
Knowledge of the vendor's marriage has been held a ground for
refusing the vendee specific performance with indemnity or abatement.1 0 This is the view adopted 'by North Carolina Courts. 11 On
the other hand, our court has held that where the contract to convey
contained provisions to do so free of all encumbrances, even though
there was knowledge of the vendor's marriage, the vendee was
entitled to abatement., 2 Inasmuch as most contracts provide for
583, 132 N. W. 63 (1911), refusing interest. See also, Wannamaker v.
Brown, 77 S.C. 64, 57 S. E. 665 (1907) ; Martin v. Baines, 217 Ala. 326, 116
So. 341 (1928).
'Shares v. Trickle, 183 Wis. 1, 197 N. W. 379, 34 A. L. R. 1016 (1924),
giving formula; Cf. American Blower Co. v. MacKenzie, 197 N. C. 152, 147 S.E.
829 (1929); 7 Paige Ch. 386 (N. Y. 1839); Goss v. Cohen, 216 App. Div.
821, 215 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1926); Hazelrig v. Hutson, 18 Ind. 481 (1862) and
Kupferberg v. Beatty, 122 Misc. 217, 202 N. Y. Supp. 712 (1923), that sum
should represent value of inchoate dower right. Osborne v. Fairley, 138 Ark.
433, 211 S.W. 917 (1919) ; Fisher v. Miller, 109 So. 257 (Fla. 1926) ; Melamed
v. Donabedian, 238 Mass. 133, 130 N. E. 110 (1921); Tebeau v. Ridge, supra
note 6; Coleman v. Whittle, 79 S.C. 212, 60 S.E. 523 (1908); O'Malley v.
Miller, 148 Wis. 393, 134 N. W. 840 (1912); Kaufman v. Hastings, 93 Ore.

623, 184 Pac. 265 (1919); Coppolina v. Radice, 30 Ohio App. 179, 164 N. E.
643 (1929).
'Fortune v. Watkins, 94 N. C. 304 (1886); Farthing v. Rochelle, 131 N. C.
563, 43 S.E. 1 (1902); Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N. C. 503; 47 S. E. 19
(1904), apparantly no request for abatement. Bethell v. McKinney, 164
N. C. 71, 80 S. E. 162 (1913).
"5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, (4 Ed. 1918) 5044, n. 21; Peoples
Saving Bank v. Parisette, supra note 6; the agreement contained no covenant
against incumbrances, the court also remarked 'if there was no collusion between the husband and wife'. See also, Barnes v. Christy, 102 Ohio St.,
adapting rule refusing specific performance with abatement save where wife's
refusal is fraudulent. Kuratli v. Jackson, supra note 6, court also notes impracticability of determining value of inchoate dower, that decree would tend
to coerce wife, and that would be making a new contract. Fisher v. Miller,
supra note 8, in connection with Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat.' 1920, §3803; Peeler v.
Levy, 26 N. J. Eq. 330 (1875) ; Long v. Chandler, 92 Atl. 256 (Del. 1914),contra as to effect of knowledge.
'Fortune v. Watkins, supra note 9, approving rule; Farthing v. Rochelle,
.supra note 9.
"Bethell v. McKinney, supra note 9.
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conveyance free of all encumbrances, the distinction as to knowledge
would thus seem to be nullified in North Carolina.
The present case presents a problem new to North Carolina in
that the case is remanded with directions to give specific performance
of a curtesy right.' 3 At common law, in other jurisdictions, specific
performance of a courtesy right has been refused.14 Surely it ought
not .be decreed under the statutory limitations now existent in North
Carolina.15 What would be the basis of valuation? The court is
ordering a futile thing-since the curtesy interest- is not a right in
property 16 there is nothing for the husband to convey. The "written
assent ' 17 of the husband is an incident of the marital relation' s and
not subject to conveyance. Even if we were to concede that "the
right to come home"'19 were sufficiently tangible to admit of specific
20
performance, the result could be defeated in any one of five ways.
Moreover, the wife escapes specific performance on the technical
invalidity 'of her contract, through failure to take her privy examination. 2 ' This requirement has been attacked in strong dissenting
opinions 22 as not only unconstitutional but archaic and worthless as
well, in view of woman's economic freedom. Hence, perhaps the
court is not unaware of the futility of its decree, but is attempting an
indirect coercion on the wife.
WALTER HoYLE.
"Joyner v. Crisp, 158 N. C. 159, 73 S. E. 1004 (1912), specific performance

was refused, the vendor owning only a life interest and the purchaser knowing
that the land in fee belonged to the vendor's children.
"Watts v. Kinney, 3 Leigh 293 (Va. 1831) ; M.'Cann v. Janes, 1 Rob. 256
(Va. 1842) ; Clark v. Reins, -12 Gratt. 98 (Va. 1855) ; Graybill v. Burgh, 89
Va. 895, 17 S. E. 558 (1893) ; for a modern ruling to the same effect, Robinson
v. Shepherd, 137 Va. 687, 120 S. E. 265 (1923).

N. C. C. S. 2506, 2510, 2519 (1919) ; N. C. Const., Art. X, s. 6.
Stallings v. Walker, 176 N. C. 321, 97 S E. 25 (1918), as stated in dissenting opinion. Jones v. Coffey, 109 N. C. 515, 14 S. E. 84 (1891).

'Stallings v. Walker, supra note 15; Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 176 N.' C.
182, 96 S. E. 988 (1918).
Walker v. Long, 109 N. C. 510, 14 S. E. 299 (1891) ; Manning v. Manning,

79 N. C. 293 (1878) ; Sipe v. Herman, 161 N. C. 107, 76 S. E. 556 (1912).
" Manning v. Manning, supra note 17; State v. Jones, 132 N. C. 1043, 43

S. E. 939 (1903).
"By conveyance of wife to a third person; death of wife without issue

born; husband predeceasing wife; will of wife; divorce a vinculo and felonious
slaying.

N. C. C. S. 997 (1919).
'(Clark, C. J. in Stallings v. Walker, .pra note 15; Wallin v. Rice, 170
N. C. 418, 87 S. E. 239 (1915) ; Graves v. Johnson, 172 N. C. 176, 90 S. E.
113 (1916) ; Satterwhite v. Gallagher, 173 N. C. 529, 92 S. E. 353 (1917).
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EQUITY-SPECIFIC
PRICE TO BE AGREED

PERFORMANCF-OPTION

TO PURCHASE AT

UpoN-Plaintiff, lessee, held an option granting

him "the first privilege of ...,buying (the entire holdings of his
lessor) on terms to be agreed upon at time such agreement is madePurchase price not to exceed $15,000." The lessor, after reserving
a life estate in a portion, contracted to convey all of these holdings to
the defendant for $3,000. Subsequently, but before the deed had
been delivered, the lessor agreed that the plaintiff might exercise his
option and purchase the property on the terms offered -by the defendant. The third party purchaser, defendant, thereafter obtained a
deed to the premises by increasing his down-payment and by assuming the responsibility of maintaining his right to the property as
against the plaintiff. Held: Specific performance decreed.1
It is elementary that price is an essential ingredient 2 and that a
contract is too incomplete and uncertain for specific performance
if it neither fixes the price itself nor provides a way 3 in which, aside
from the agreement of the parties, it may 'be determined. 4 For these
reasons, relief has been refused where the options read: first opportunity to buy,5 the refusal, 6 first chance to buy,7 privilege of purchasing within thirty days after notice of intention to sell,8 and
1

Parker v. Murphy, 146 S. E. 254 (Va. 1929).
'FRY, SPECIFC PERFORMA CCE(6th ed. 1921) §253.
'An option to purchase at a "fair price" or a fair market value is neither
uncertain nor incomplete, as a court may determine what is fair or reasonabe,
Myer v. Metzger, 61 N. J. Eq. 522, 59 Atl. 247 (1904) ; Lester Agricultural
Chemical Wks. v. Selby, 68 N. J. Eq. 2171, 59 Atl. 247 (1904).
Arbitration as a method of fixing the price has, for specific performance
purposes, been a stumbling block because of the practical difficulties in the way
of enforcement, except where the court could regard it as an incident of the
major relief requested or where the plaintiff had greatly changed his position in
reliance upon the enforceability of the agreement; see PomEnoy, SPEcIc
PMFORMANCE (3rd ed. 1926) §149. For a summary of recent legislation affecting this problem see Sturgesi Arbitration under the North CarolinaArbitration
Statute-The Uniform Arbitration Act (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rev. 363; Recent
Statutory Changes in North Carolina-Arbitration(1927) 6 N. C. L. Rev. 170.
'FRY, op. cit. supra note 2, §254; PomERoy, op. cit. supra note 3, §148;
3 WILLSTON, CON-TRAcrs (1920) §1424; 36 Cyc. 595; 25 R. C. L. 218; note
1 L. R. A. 380; note L. R. A. 1917D, 380; (1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 77; (1926)
12 Cornell L. Qr. 367; Pound, Progress of the Laau-Equity (1919) 33
Harvard L. Rev. 433.
'Wolf v. Lodge, 159 Iowa 162, 140 N. W. 429 (1913).
'Fogg v. Price, 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741 (1888).
'Folsam v. Haar, 218 Ill. 369, 75 N. E. 987, 109 Am. St. Rep. 297 (1905);
Gosselin v. Thursdon, 81 N. H. 65, 121 At!. 343 (1923), agreement to give
plaintiff the "first chance to buy" was fulfilled when, before offering to others,
the defendant gave the plaintiff an opportunity to make an offer.
"McClung Drug Co. v. City Realty Co., 91 N. J. Eq. 216, 108 At!. 767 (1919).
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first right to purchase at a price to be agreed upon.9 On the other
hand, specific performance has usually been granted where the
option was that of purchasing at the same price as any other purchaser may have offered, 10 to purchase at a price as low as any other
bona fide purchaser would offer,:" to renew a lease at a price responsible parties will agree to give,' 2 and first refusal at the price
named by any other offeror. 13 Here the standard has become available in the form of an offer by a third person and the courts have
4
relied upon this as completing the contract. An old English case,'
however, found such a test impracticable where the option was to
buy at a given sum less than any other purchaser would give. But
no offer had been made, and the case is affected by other contingendes of a complicated marriage settlement. A later English case' 5
upheld an option of a "first refusal" in the event the property should
be proposed to be used for a given purpose, where the event had
occurred and negotiations for sale to a third party were pending,
and where, in addition, the optionor had offered the land to the plaintiff at an extravagant sum and had rejected a reasonable counteroffer, the court inferring that the term "first refusal" meant at a
price which some other person was willing to give. Still other
courts have granted relief where the plaintiff, in case of sale, was to
be given preference as purchaser,1 6 and where he was to have the
prior option of purchasing at a price to be agreed upon but not to
exceed $16,500.17
The result of the principal case was easier to achieve both because of the fixed maximum which, as in the last case mentioned,
gave the option a tone of certainty, and because of the subsequent
conduct of the parties. This conduct would have satisfied the severest demands for a subsequent agreement.
Tnos. W. SPRINKLE.
See Frey v. Camp, 131 Iowa 109, 107 N. W. 1106 (1906), specific performance not decreed because the optionor made no attempt to sell. Supra note 4.
11Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill.
403, 26 N. E. 601, 37 N. E. 73, 23 L. R. A. 555
(1891). Contra: Gelsten v. Sigmund, 27 Md. 324 (1867); case went off on
lack of mutuality.
" Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 617 (1912).
Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo. 25, 100 Am. Dec. 252.
'See Race v. Groves, 43 N. J. Eq. 284, 7 AtI. 667 (1887), enforcement
denied on grounds of estoppel.
" Bromley v. Jeffreys, 2 Vern. 416 (1700).
' Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co., (1901) 2
Ch. D. 37. For a discussion see, Van Hecke, Ispeaion Incident to Option
(1927) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 14.
"Robinson v. Drew, 144 AtI. 67 (N. H. 1928).
" Kastens v. Rutland, 94 N. J. Eq. 451, 120 AtI. 21; option to renew lease
"at such rental as may then be agreed upon," Young v. Nelson, 209 Pac 515
(Wash. 1922), Note, (1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 77.
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PLEADING-SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION-SUBROGATION OF
INSURANCE COMPANY-A recent comment in 7 N. C. L. Rev. 326

(April 1929) discussed the question of an injury to a person and
his property by a single wrongful act as giving rise to one cause of
action by the plaintiff, or more than one. It was shown that the
majority of the courts, including North Carolina, hold that such
injury to a person and his property by a single wrongful act constitutes but one cause of action on the part of the injured plaintiff,
and could not be split without the defendant's consent.
It was held in a more recent decision' that when the plaintiff
and his property are injured by a single wrongful act on the part
of the defendant, and the insurance, company pays the full liability
for the property damage and then sues and recovers judgment against
the defendant for the property damage only, such action would not
bar a subsequent action by the plaintiff against the defendant for
the personal injuries alone.
When the insurance company has paid the full amount of the
damage to the property of the insured, caused by a wrongdoer, then
by the equitable principle of subrogation, it may maintain an action
against the wrongdoer to recover the amount so paid. This does not
require an assignment of any cause of action by the insured, but the
insurance company becomes the real party in interest 2 by reason of the
existing relation, and may recover the amount it has had to pay.3 But
when the damage to the property exceeds the insurance money paid,
the suit must be brought in the name of the assured, who may recover
full value of the damage to the property from the wrongdoer, but as
to the amount paid him by the insurance company he becomes trustee
4
for the benefit of the company.
Although the insurance company was subrogated to the rights
of the plaintiff it could not have recovered on the facts as alleged
'Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N. C. 100 (1929).
2 N. C. C. S., §446 (1919) provides that "every action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided. .. "
'Cunningham v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 139 N. C. 427, 51 S. E. 1029
(1905); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Messick Grocery Co., 147 N. C.
510, 61 S. E. 375 (1908); Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 165 N. C.
136, 80 S. E. 1069 (1914); Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C. 290,
88 S. E. 426 (1916) ; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rowland Lumber Co., 186 N.
C. 269, 119 S. E. 362 (1923).
'Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., supra note 3, in which Mr. Justice
Allen explains the doctrine of subrogation in North Carolina of an insurance
company to the rights of the insured, citing many decisions from the courts
of other states and from the Federal courts on the proposition. Southern
Stock Fire Ins. Co. v. Raleigh, Charlotte and Southern R. Co., 179 N. C.
290, 102 S. E. 504 (1920).
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in the plaintiff's action, but had to allege these facts and then go
further and allege other facts essential to show its rights as real
party in interest with respect to the damage to the property, thereby
constituting substantially a different cause of action between different
parties. The court points out that this decision is not contrary to the
rule of one cause of action by the injured plaintiff for injuries to his
person and his property -by a single wrongful act, but that the case
involves a different situation.
The decision in the instant case would clearly follow in the
jurisdictions holding that an injury to a person and his property by a
single wrongful act gives rise to two causes of action on the part
of the injured plaintiff.5 It has been held, however, in jurisdictions
holding that there is but one cause of action on the part of the injured
plaintiff, that a recovery by the insurance company for the property
damage bars the plaintiff's action for personal injuries.8 Such holdings seem to differ from the instant case, for in those decisions the
insurance company is not subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff
upon equitable principles, but upon assignment by the insured under
a clause in the policy.
.A. W. GHOLSON, JR.
PROPETY-CONVEYANCES-PROBATE

AND REIsTRAToN-In a

recent North Carolina case,1 plaintiff and defendants claim land
under one Berry as a common source of title. Plaintiff's deed was
registered in 1903, the defendants' in 1910. A justice of the peace
in making the certificate of the execution of plaintiff's deed failed
to state therein that the attesting witness was examined under oath.
It was held, among other things, that the above omission in certifying the plaintiff's deed rendered the probate defective upon its face
and therefore invalidated plaintiff's title as against the defendants',
whose deed was properly probated and registered. The holding is
sound and in compliance with the statutes2 of the State. The possi'bility of loss resulting from mere negligence in the probating and
registration of an instrument makes pertinent a comment upon the
prerequisites of a duly recorded instrument.
'Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N. Y. 162, 158 N. E. 60 (1927).
'Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 Pac. 960 (1926). But in Underwriter's at Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 106 Miss. 244, 63 So.
455 (1913) the court said when the insurance company was subrogated by an
assignment by the injured plaintiff it was to the .best end of justice to allow
it to become two separate causes of action.
'McClure v. Crow, 196 N. C. 657 (1929).
'N. C. Code Ann. (1927), §§3308, 3309.
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The object of probate and registration is to give notice to creditors
and purchasers for value, or others whose rights might be seriously
impaired by the instrument." No notice, however full or formal, will
supply the want of registration, 4 and "until a deed is proved in the
manner prescribed by statute, the public register has no authority to
put it on his book."' ; The statute provides that a deed must be
acknowledged by the grantor or his signature proven on oath by one
or more witnesses 6 before one authorized -by law to take such acknowledgment or proof.7 Taking acknowledgment of an instrument

is a judicaal or quasi-judicial act and the acknowledging officer is
disqualified to probate an instrument to which he is a party, trustee
or cestui que trust.8 The disqualification must appear upon the face
of the record to nullify registration 9 and "where the incapacity of a
officer who takes a probate does not appear on record, one taking
under the grantee gets good title." 10 Thus, where it did not appear
on the record that a justice of the peace of South Carolina probated
a deed while in North Carolina which was registered in North Carolina the registration was held valid."
'Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 263, 266, 75 S. E. 800 (1912); a deed

is good and valid between the parties thereto without registration. "The title
vests, as against the grantor, and all others 'except creditors and purchasers for
value,' from the delivery of the deed." Warren v. Williford, 148 N: C. 474,
479, 62 S. E. 697 (1908).
"A defendant, in possession of land under a prior parol conveyance, does
not have good title as against the plaintiff who has a registered deed of conveyance even though the defendant offered to prove that the plaintiff had actual
notice because "no notice can supply the lack of registration." Wood v. Tinsley.
138 N. C. 503, 51 S.E. 59 (1908) ; Maddox v. Arp, et al, 114 N. C. 58, 19
S. E. 665 (1893) Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903).
'Williams v. Griffin, 49 N. C. 31, 32 (1856).
'N. C. Code Ann. (1927), §3308. Where the acknowledgment of the
grantor failed to appear upon the face of an otherwise duly recorded deed, the
court said, "it is clear that there were no valid probate and registration as to
the grantor therein." Hatcher v. Hatcher, 127 N. C. 200, 37 S. E. 207 (1900).
'N. C. Code Ann. (1927), §3293, which provides that an instrument "may
be proved or acknowledged before any one of the following officials of the
State: the several justices of the supreme court, the several judges of the
superior court, commissioners of affidavits appointed by the governor of this
State, the clerk of the supreme court, the several clerks of the superior court,
the deputy clerks of the superior court, the several clerks of the criminal
courts, notaries public, and the several justices of the peace."
"A deputy clerk is not qualified to exercise the "particular judicial function" of probate when he is one of the grantees in a chattel mortgage, Cowan
v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684, 128 S.E. 155 (1925) ; Long v. Crews, 113 N. C. 256,
18 S. E. 499 (1893).
'Bank of Abbeville v. Tolbert, 192 N. C. 126, 133 S. E. 558 (1926);
Blanton v. Bostic, 126 N. C. 418, 35 S.E. 1035 (1900) ; Quinnerly v. Quinnerly,
114 N. C. 145, 19 S.E. 99 (1893).
'*Blanton v. Bostic, supra note 9, at p. 421.
"Bank v.Tolbert, supra note 9.
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The certificate of the acknowledging officer shall be examined by
the clerk of court of the county where the deed is offered for registration, and if found sufficient, the clerk must adjudicate it so and
order it to be registered. 12 If the clerk is disqualified because he is
a party to the instrument or otherwise interested, the adjudication and
order for registration must be made by his deputy, a clerk of Superior
Court of another county, a justice of the Supreme Court or judge
of the Superior Court.' 3 The adjudication must be signed by the
clerk.' 4 This adjudication is mandatory and its omission will invalidate the registration.' 5
Upon the Clerk's order for registration, the instrument must be
presented to the Register of Deeds to be registered, who must index
and cross index the names of the parties to the instrument within
twenty-four hours after registration.' 6 There is a division of authority
as to whether the indexing and cross-indexing is an essential part of
registration.' 7 North Carolina formerly held that this was not
essentid l1 8 but has recently adopted the more practical view that "the
indexing was an essential part of their (instruments') registration."'1
FRAZIER GLENN, JR.
PROPERTY-NAvIGABLE WATERS-TITLE TO LANDS BETWEEN
Low AND HIGH WATER MARK-By several grants "pursuant to the
act establishing the mode of granting vacant lands," plaintiff purchased 34,290 acres of land, comprised mlostly of islands and marshes,
which were bounded and trellised by bays, inlets, creeks, and other
navigable streams.' It was conclusively established that all of the
land except 6.2 acres was completely submerged at high tide. DefenN. C. Code Ann. (1927) §3305.
"Idem.
"Woodlief v. Woodlief, 192 N. C. 634, 135 S. E. 612 (1926).

Champion Fibre Co. v. Cozard, 183 N. C. 600, 112 S. E. 810 (1922).
" N. C. Code Ann. (1927) §3561.
",For discussion of authorities favoring view that indexing is not essential, see, 1

DmmLi,

Drans, §681; contra, see Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.

Drake 87 N. Y. 257 (1881).
"Davies v. Whittaker, 114 N. C. 279, 19 S. E. 699 (1894).
"Ely v. Norman, 175 N. C. 294, 95 S.E. 543 (1918) ; Fowle v. Ham, 176
N. C. 12, 96 S.E. 639 (1918); Bank of Sanford v. Currie, 190 N. C. 260, 129
S. E. 605 (1925). In Clement v. Harrison, 193 N. C. 825, 138 S.E. 308
(1927), see 6 N. C. L. Rev 103, a deed from grantor Harrison was registered,
indexed, and cross,indexed under letter "H," and where the indexing appeared
under subdivision "Haa to Hap," instead of in the subdivision "Har to Haz,"
the registration was held valid despite the error in subdividing.
"It appears to be conceded that all of the bays, inlets, creeks and other
waters by which the several tracts are bounded are tidal and navigable waters,"
said Judge Cothran in his dissenting opinion in the instant case.
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dant, by virtue of a lease from the State Board of Fisheries, 2 planted
oyster beds on certain land, claimed by plaintiff, lying between low
and high water mark. Plaintiff sued for $10,000 damages and an
injunction against further trespass by the defendant. Judgment for
defendant.3 Held that plaintiff did not establish title to the land in
controversy.
The prevailing rule in England and America is that under ordinary circumstances a grant by the State to land bounded by tidal
navigable waters passes no title between low and high water mark
unless the grant specifies to low water mark.4 In some jurisdictions,
however, the ordinary grant extends the boundaries to the low water
mark. 5
In the instant case it seems that practically all of the plaintiff's
land may 'be correctly termed tide land, since it is covered and uncovered successively by the ebb and flow of the tide so as to affect
the condition of the soil and to prevent the growth of vegetation.0
Thus it is submitted that the peculiar facts of this case merit a
more liberal construction of the plaintiff's original grants. By such
a construction his boundaries would be extended to low water mark
and thereby include the land in controversy and the other land similar
thereto. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be deprived of the very use
2Civil
Code of South Carolina §983 (1922).
3 Cape Romain Land & Improvement
Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co.,
146 S. E. 434 (S. C. 1928).
' Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1894) (citing North Carolina decisions as approving the common law rule--but see infra note 5(a);
State v. Pinckney, 22 S. C. 484 (1884); Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co.,
42 S. C. 138, 19 S. E. 963 (1894) ; Johnson v. State, 114 Ga. 790, 40 S. E. 807
(1902). See (1922), 36 Harv. L. Rev. 763.
(a) Wall v. Pittsburg Harbor Co., 152 Pa. 427, 25 Atl. 647 (1893) ; Taylor
v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S. E. 875 (1904), based on statute of 1679;
Hess v. Cheney, 83 Ala. 251, 3 So. 791 (1888) ; Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N. C. 30

(1828).

(b) But the later
Carolina cases
to sustain
common
view, Ward v. Willis,North
51 N. C. 183 (1858) seem
and Shepard's the
Point Land law
Co.
v. Atlantic Hotel, 132 N. C. 517, 44 S. E. 39 (1903) in the absence of statutes
which regulate one's right to enter or to construct wharves to deep water.
Gregory v. Forbes, 96 N. C. 77, 1 S. E. 541 (1887); Lenoir County v. Crabtree.
158 N. C. 358, 74 S. E. 105 (1912).
(c) In the New England states the peculiar rule, granting title to low water
mark unless the tide ebbs and flows over 100 rods, is 'based on the Colonial
Ordinance of 1647 which is still in force in those states. Proctor v. Maine
Cent. R. Co., 96 Me. 458, 52 Atl. 933 (1902); Commonwealth v. Alger, 7
Cush. (Mass.) 53 (1851).
OWelch v. Browning, 115 Iowa 690, 87 N. W. 430 (1901); People v.
Kerber, 152 Cal. 731, 93 Pac. 878 (1908). But see Clement v. Watson, 63
Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912) holding that land which does not border immediately
on a navigable stream is not tide land.
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for which he purchased the land, as "it is only valuable for the
propagation of oysters and shellfish."

It is apparent that the Court correctly applied the gerieral rule as
regards grants on tidal navigable streams. But, following its general

policy, the Court strictly construed the plaintiff's grants so as to
preserve in the State the right to lease the oyster beds as a source
of revenue. Other decisions have shown the Court's determination to
allow the State to control all marshes and streams which are found to

contain rich deposits of phosphate. 7

J. B. LEwis.
TORTS-LIBuEL--ExTRINsic FACTS NECESSARY TO RENDER COMmUNICATION LiBELoUS-In the case of Spigner v. Providence Insurance Co.,' the plaintiff, agent of defendant Insurance Co., wrote
four policies, collected the first premiums, and remitted same to the
company in due time. About two months later the company notified the policy-holders of cancellation of policies for non-payment of
premiums. The court sustained a demurrer to the agent's suit for
libel. Was there error in not submitting the case to the jury?
As the notice was not libelous per se, the plaintiff must show it
libelous in view of extrinsic facts by way of innuendo.2 If there can be
any doubt as to whether the innuendo is warranted by the language
sued on, the case must go to the jury.3 The language must be interT

State v. Pinckney, supra note 4, (held that the defendant acquired only

255 acres of land by a conveyance made to him at a valid tax sale, even though

the plat included the entire island of 6,000 acres, some 5,745 acres of which

was marsh land and rich in phosphate deposits) ; State v. Guano Co., 22 S. C.

50 (1884), where the State enjoined defendant from further mining of phosphate and exacted payment for that already disposed of, even though defen-

dant had been paying a rent of $500 per month to the supposed owner; Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co., supra note 4. See Coosaw Mining Co. v. South
Carolina, 144 U. S. 550, 36 L. Ed. 537 (1892).
' Spigner v. Providence Life and Accident Insurance Co., 146 S. E.

8 (s. c. 1929).
1O'Connell v. Press Pub. Co., 214 N. Y. 352, 108 N. E. 556 (1915);
Erwin v. Record Pub. Co., 154 Cal. 79, 97 Pac. 21 (1908). Words not
libelous per se must be accompanied ,by innuendo showing how the words
are libelous.
IBlack et al v. State Co., 93 S. C. 467, 77 S. E. 51 (1913); Bradbury v. Segel, et al., 121 Me. 146, 116 A. 65 (1922); Baker v. Warner,*
231 U. S. 588, 34 S. Ct. 115 (1913). "The question now is where does
Warner's campaign money come from. How about the race tracks?" the
innuendo charging that the language insinuated gambling. Held a case for
the jury. The court rules that the words are susceptible of having defamatory
meaning-in light of the extrinsic circumstances and the jury must decide
whether or not they had such meaning.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
preted as the average reader would understand it.4 The writer has presented the facts of the Spigner case to sixteen persons. Twelve agreed
on the inference that the agent had embezzled the premium money
while four .believed that there had been an honest mistake in clerical
work.5 It is also interesting to note that in the Spigner case, and in
the case of Phillips v. Union Indemnity Co.,6 where the facts are
identical with those of the Spigner case, the judges were divided on
the question. These facts indicate that the notice in question wds susceptible of two meanings, one libelous and the other innocent. Such
matters asthe reputation of the agent in the community and his past
dealings with policy-holders would have a bearing on the proper
inference to be drawn by the jury. Whether the notice in question
actually imputed dishonesty to the agent is clearly within the pro7
vince of the jury.

H. B. PARXER.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF AN ORDINANCE NEGLIGENCE PER sE-PRoxiMATE CAusE-The plaintiff,' free from contri-

butory negligence, 2 was a guest in an automobile driven by the owner.
The automobile ran into the defendant's freight train which had been
blocking the crossing for longer than ten minutes in violation of a
town ordinance.3 The plaintiff sues for negligent injury setting up
"Dusabeck v. Martz, 121 Okla. 241, 249 Pac. 145, 49 A. L. . 253 (1926) ;
Commercial Pub. Co. v. Smith, 149 Fed. 704, 6th circuit (1907). "Sheriff
arrested Fred Smith. Smith is wanted' for killing old man F. E. Poch, the
incentive being robbery. Smith does not deny being the man wanted, but claims
he did not do the killing," was held a case for the jury, the innuendo charging
that the language not only stated the charge but insinuated guilt.

The court

says "
must be read and construed in sense that the readers to whom
it is addressed will understand it-."
'The facts of the case under consideration were presented to 16 people,

getting a cross-section of opinion from a law teacher, a judge of the U. S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, law students, undergraduates, and business men.
The experiment was as follows. "If an insurance agent wrote out a policy
for you and you paid him the first year's premium and about two months later
you received a notice from the company that your policy was cancelled for nonpayment of premium what would you think was wrong?" Twelve answered
that they would believe the agent guilty of embezzlement; four that there
had been a clerical error.
'Phillips v. Union Indemnity Co., 28 Fed. 2d. 701 (C. C. A. 4th. 1928).

'Supra note 3.

'Dickey v. Atlantic Coast Line Raili-oad Company, 196 N. C. 726, 147
S.E. 15 (1929).
2 It
was established that the plaintiff hid no control over the driver, and
that it was not a joint enterprise, therefore no negligence of the driver can be
imputed to the plaintiff.
'"It is hereby declared a nuisance for a train or engine or any part thereof
of a train, to stand on or across, or block any of the street crossings or side-

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
the violation of the ordinance by the defendant as the wrong incurred.
It was held that the defendant's motion for non-suit should be denied,
for violation of an ordinance is negligence per se, and the question
of proximate cause should be submitted to the jury.
Violation of an ordinance or statute in North Carolina is negligence per se,4 but becomes actionable only when found to be the
proximate cause of the injury. 5 When more than one inference
may be drawn, proximate cause is a question for the jury." But
where there is no dispute as to the facts, and such facts are not reasonably capable of more than one inference, it is the duty of the
judge to instruct, as a matter of law, whether the injury was the
proximate result of the negligence of the defendant.7
Using this latter rule the dissenting opinion 8 takes the position
that the non-suit should have been allowed. It argues that the ordinance was to prohibit the blocking of street crossings by trains in
walk crossings in the town of Parmelee, North Carolina, longer than ten
minutes at a time, under a penalty not to exceed five dollars for each and

every offence."
'Leathers v. Tobacco Company, 144 N. C. 330, 57 S. E. 11 (1907), in which

it was established that violation of a statute is negligence per se instead of
evidence of negligence as before held. Starnes v. The Albion Manufacturing
Co., 147 N. C. 556, 61 S. E. 525 (1908) ; Paul v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
Co., 170 N. C. 230, 87 S. E. 66 (1915); Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C. 125,
81 S. E. 1066 (1914); Zanier v. Southern Express Co., 171 N. C. 692, 89 S. E.
43 (1916) ; Stone v. Texas Co., 180 N. C. 546, 1(05 S. E. 425 (1920) ; Stutz
v. Thomas, 182 N. C. 470, 109 S. E. 361 (1921).
It is submitted, however, that the violation of a statute or ordinance cannot
be strictly termed negligence. Essentially, "negligence consists in the failure
to exercise that degree of care, under given circumstances, which a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances." Stedman
v. O'Neil, 82 Conn. 199, 206, 72 At. 923, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1229 (1909).
A rule of law laid down by the legislature is a rigid and inflexible rule, which
cannot be said to accord with the particular circumstances presented. A violation of a statute or ordinance seems better expressed by Mr. Justice Walker
in Fry v. Southern Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 294, 111 S. E. 354 (1922) in
which he says, "where a statute is violated it is such a distinct legal wrong
that if it be the proximate cause of the injury to another, it will constitute an
actionable wrong or tort, but the jury- must find the facts essential to the
application of the principle." The term "a distinct legal wrong" more nearly
fits the violation of an ordinance or statute than does the term "negligence."
See 1 N. C. L. Rev. 192.
"Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C. 125, 81 S. E. 1066 (1914) ; Peters v. The
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 194 N. C. 172, 138 S. E. 595 (1927) ; Giles
v. Transit Corporation, 193 N. C. 346, 137 S. E. 153 (1927).
'Stutz v. Thomas, 182 N. C. 470, 109 S. E. 361 (1921) ; Ridge v. High Point,
176 N. C. 421, 97 S. E. 369 (191.$); Stone v. Texas Company, 180 N. C.
546, 105 S. E. 425 (1920).
'Leathers v. Tobacco Co., 144 N. C. 330, 57 S. E. 11 (1907); Taylor v.
Stewart, 172 N. C. 203, 90 S. E. 134 (1916).
'Mr. Justice Connor writing the dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice Adams
concurring in the dissent.

484

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

order to maintain a free flow of traffic. It was not the purpose of
the ordinance to protect travelers on the public streets from injuries
received in collisions with railroad cars standing on crossings.
To establish actionable negligence, the question of contributory
negligence being out of the case, the plaintiff must show not only
that the defendant neglected a duty, and he would not have been
injured if the duty had been performed, but he must also show that
the duty was imposed for his benefit, and was one which the defendant owed to him for his security from the injury under the circumstances in which they were placed. 9 In determining whether the
violation of a statute is a wrong which will support an action for
damages, the court is called upon to determine whether the plaintiff
is one for whose benefit or protection the statute is enacted. 10 The
North Carolina court seems to have done this in Leathers v. Tobacco
2
Company" and Starnes v. The Albion Manufacturing Company'
where it said the statute was intended to protect children of tender
years from the particular injury, and also in Rich v. Asheville Electric Company'3 where the statute was interpreted by the court not to
But in the majority of the North Carolina cases the court has
seemingly ignored in its decisions the question of whether the rule
of law invoked by the plaintiff for his protection was intended to include the risk in question. The cases go to the jury solely on the
question of proximate cause, which frequently includes the question
of the purpose and intent of the statute or ordinance. 14
The wrong in the instant case' 5 was not in -blocking the street
crossing, but rather in blocking the crossing for more than ten
minutes. 16 The evident purpose of the ordinance, as pointed out in
the dissenting opinion, was to prevent interference with the free flow
of traffic, not to prevent collisions. It became negligence only after
' Ramsbottom v. Railroad, 138 N. C. 38, 50 S. E. 448 (1905) ; DeLancy v.
Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N. C. 647, 650, 135 S. E. 791 (1926).
"oPlatt v. Southern Photo Material Co., 4 Ga. App. 159, 60 S. E. 1068
(1908) ; Morressey v. Providence & W. R. Co., 15 R. I. 271, 3 Atl. 10 (1886) ;
HFrayes v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 111 U. S. 228, 240, 4 Sup Ct. 369, 28
L. Ed. 410 (1884) ; Sutton v. Town of Wauvatosa, 29 Wis. 21, 9 Am. Rep. 534
(1871) ; Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874).
21144 N. C. 330, 57 S. E. 11 (1907).

12147 N. C. 556, 61 S. E. 525 (1908).
'3152 N. C. 689, 68 S. E. 232, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 428 (1910).

cover the plaintiff's injury.
"Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C. 125, 81 S. E. 1066 (1914), the court saying
the violation of an ordinance is negligence per se, .but is only evidence of the
right to recover which depends on (1) negligence and (2) proximate cause.

"Supra note 1.
"Supra note 2.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
the train had blocked the crossing for more than ten minutes. If
the collision had occurred during the first ten minutes there would
have been no question of negligence, though under either circumstance the defendant's train would have been there.
It is submitted that the blocking of the crossing was a substantial
factor in the cause of the injury, and the violation of the ordinance
is negligence per se, but the majority opinion under the guise of
proximate cause did not consider whether the plaintiff was protected
by the ordinance from the hazard encountered by running into the
train. This is a vital question in the case. It was a question of law
for the court,' 7 and not a question of fact for the jury. Although
the purpose of the ordinance was considered in the dissenting opinion
it was hidden under the label of proximate cause.' 8

A. W. GHOLSON, JR.
TORTS-VIOLATION

OF STATUTE-FEDERAL

OFFICER PURSUING

SUSPECTED VIOLATOR-In Lilly v. State of West V7a.,' defendant, a
national prohibition officer, was driving rapidly through a city attempting to overtake a suspected liquor transporter. While passing
a truck near a street intersection, defendant killed one F, who was
crossing the street. Defendant was sounding a siren, keeping a
careful lookout, and after seeing deceased, made all possible attempts
to avoid hitting him. The indictment ivas for involuntary manslaughter. The case was removed to the federal court. The District
Court found defendant guilty on the grounds of negligence in violating three city ordinances: exceeding the speed limit; not keeping
his car under proper control for immediate stop at intersections; and,
usurping the pedestrian's right of way at a crossing not regulated by
officers or traffic devices. The Circuit Court reversed the decision,
holding that a federal officer is excepted from the operation of state
laws which may interfere with the proper discharge of his duties.
The breach of a state law or city ordinance, passed for the pro2
tection of life and property, is generally held to be negligence per se.
"

Platt
v. Southern
Photo article
MaterialContributory
Co., Supra note
10.
See Mr.
Leon Green's
Negligence and Proximate

Cause, 6 N. C. L. Rev. pp.. 13-21 (1927); Green's Rationole of Proximate
Cause (1927); Also Professor E. M. Morgan's book review of Green's
Rationale of Proximate Cause, 41 Har. L. Rev. 939 (1928), in which he expresses his opinion that it is neither undesirable or impractical to let the jury

pass upon the limits of protection.
Lilly v. State of West Va., 29 Fed. (2d) 61. (C. C. A. 4th 1928).
- Henningsen et al v. Markowitz, 230 N. Y. Supp. 313 (1928).
The N. Y.
court in this case holds that the breach of a statute is the proximate cause of
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Defendant, to escape civil liability, must show that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence, or that defendant's violation of law was
not the proximate cause of the injury.8
The majority of state jurisdictions have granted immunity from
criminal prosecution to public officers, where breaches of law are
necessary for efficient performance of duty.4 This is especially true
in regard to the violation of speed regulations by traffic policemen 5
and firemen. 6 The Texas court, however, refused to declare immunity from a city ordinance to a motorcycle policeman, on the
ground that such exceptions should be made by the legislature and
7
not ingrafted by the courts.
Traffic regulations are ordinarily binding upon federal officers
when there is no necessity for the breach.8
the injuries sustained.

Statutes intend to protect the public from dangers

reasonably to be anticipated.
City Ice and Delivery Co. v. Lecari, 210 Ala. 629, 98 So. 901, (1924).
Opitz v. Schenck, 178 Cal. 639, 174 Pac. 40 (1918).
Stan. Oil Co. N. J. v. Roberts, 130 Va. 532, 107 S.E. 839 (1921).
Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N. C. 203, 90 S.E 134 (1916).
' 1 N. C. Law R. 192, P. H. W., Public Wrong and PrivateAction its N. C.
In Fry v. Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354 (1922), Walker, J.,
said, "Ve have held that where a statute or an ordinance is violated, it is such
a distinct legal wrong that if it be the proximate cause of the injury to another,
it will then constitute an actionable wrong or tort, but the jury must find the
facts essential to the application of the principle." Citing Stone v. Texas Co.,
180 N. C. 546, 105 S.E. 425 (1920).
Deputy v. Kimmel, 73 W. Va. 595, 80 S. E. 919, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.)
989 (1914).
Davis v. John Brener Co. et al;167 Cal. 683, 140 P. 586, (1914).
"Michie's N. C. Code, 1927, §2621 (50). Motor Vehicles Uniform Act,
P. L. 1927, c. 148, s. 8. Immunity granted to officers: (1) When in chase or
apprehension of violators of law or suspected violators; (2) Fire Dept. and
patrol wagons, in the course of their duty; (3) Private ambulances in an
emergency. "This exemption shall not protect the driver of any such vehicle
from the consequences of a reckless disregard for the safety of others."
State v. Gorham, 110 Wash. 330, 188 Pac. 457 (1920).
'State v. Gorham, supra note 4.
"Farley v. Mayor of N. Y. City, 152 N. Y. 222, 46 N. E. 506 (1897).
Hubert, Adm. v. Granzow, 131 Minn. 361, 155 N. W. 204 (1915).
' Keevil v. Ponsford et al, 173 S. W. 518 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915), plaintiff, a
motorcycle policeman, held guilty of negligence per se in running 60 miles
an hour on a city street in an attempt to catch an auto exceeling the speed limit.
Plaintiff ran into a truck load of brick negligently left in the street without
a red light, as required by statute. The decision was placed on the basis
of concurrent negligence and proximate cause.
The Texas legislature has since expressly exempted fire patrols and vehicles,
police patrols, ambulances and physicians responding to emergency calls from
operation of statute regulating speed. Police patrols held to include motorcycles operated by policeman in patroling streets and highways. Hubbs Diggs
Co. v. Bell, 293 S.W. 808 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
'Commonwealth v. Closson, 229 Mass. 329, 118 N. E. 653, L. R. A. 1918C,
939. In which it was held that a carrier of the U. S. mail is not permitted to
disregard reasonable ordinances.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
In cases of necessity, or when the state laws prevent the proper
enforcement of federal law, the state must accede supremacy to the
Federal Government. 9 McCulloch v. Maryland settled that, "The
states have no power by taxation or otherwise to retard, impede,
burden, or in any manner control, the operation of the constitutional
laws enacted by congress to carry to execution the powers vested in
the general government". 9
The issue raised by this case is, "Does the proper enforcement of
the Eighteenth Amendment necessarily demand that prohibition
officers be immune from state traffic laws ?" It may be granted that
speed is necessary to apprehend liquor transporters who disregard
speed laws under pressure of possible capture. The states have
granted immunity to traffic officers in arresting traffic violators.10
The principal case goes no farther. It does not relieve prohibition
officers of "due care under the circumstances,"' 1 but relieves him

J. A. WUmiAms.
CENSORING THE TALKIES-By a very liberal construction the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held its censorship statute to
include the spoken words of moving picture entertainments,' and
so has reversed the decision at trial which was commented upon in a
2
previous issue of this Review.
Chief reliance is placed upon the popular view, sponsored by
the producing companies' own advertising, that the feature presented
U. S. v. Hart, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15, 316, 193, (1817). An employee of the

U. S. does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the
course of his employment.
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 41 S. Ct. 16, 65 L. Ed. 126 (1920).
A mail carrier of the V. S. is presumed to be competent by virtue of his
employment, and a state license is not necessary for him to operate a mail
truck in a state.
State v. Burton, 41 R. I. 303, 103 Ati. 962, L. RL A. 1918F, 559. State
laws are held subordinate to the exigencies of military operations.
In Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1. Habeas Corpus granted to a deputy marshall of
the U. S. who shot and killed a man in pursuance of his duty in protecting
a Federal judge from a murderous assault by deceased.
State v. Gorham, supra note 4.
11
Edberg v. Johnson, 149 Minn. 395, 184 N. W. 12 (1921).
In which the court said, "A public officer is not to be deemed negligent
merely because he fails to observe the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Act.
His conduct is to be examined and tested by another standard. He is required
to observe the care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances."

of the ordinary consequences of violating a statute.
"In re Fox Film Corp., 145 Atl. 514 Pa, (1929), Kephart, J., dissenting.
(1929) 7 N. C.L. Ray. 219.

